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ABSTRACT 
In May 2017, a global ransomware campaign adversely 
affected approximately 48 UK hospitals. Response to the 
WannaCry cyber-attack resulted in many hospital networks being 
taken offline, and non-emergency patients being refused care. 
This is a clear example that data behaviour within healthcare 
infrastructures needs to be monitored for malicious, erratic or 
unusual activity. There is a perceived lack of threat within 
healthcare organisations with regards to cyber-security. Hospital 
infrastructures present a unique threat vector, with a dependence 
on legacy software, medical devices and bespoke software. 
Additionally, many PCs are shared by a number of users, all of 
whom use a variety of disparate IT systems. Every healthcare 
infrastructure configuration is unique and a one size fits all 
security solution cannot be applied to healthcare. Existing cyber-
security technology within hospital infrastructures is typically 
perimeter-focused. Once a malicious user has compromised the 
boundary through a backdoor, there is a lack of security 
architecture monitoring active potential threats inside the network. 
Therefore, this paper presents research towards a system, which 
can detect unusual data behaviour through the use of advanced 
data analytics and visualisation techniques. Machine learning 
algorithms have the capability to learn patterns of data and profile 
users’ behaviour, which can be represented visually. The proposed 
system is tailored to healthcare infrastructures by learning typical 
data behaviours and profiling users. The system adds to the 
defence-in-depth of the healthcare infrastructure by understanding 
the unique configuration of the network and autonomously 
analysing. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Modern IT systems are crucial to clinical care service providers. 
They are relied upon to collect and store sensitive patient data, 
govern human life support devices and enable communication for 
archiving and information sharing [1]. Disabling or disrupting the 
any of these systems would have far reaching consequences within 
healthcare infrastructures. Relying on traditional security models to 
safeguard these systems has proven to be ineffective; particularly 
in relation to the emergence of new technology such as mobility, 
cloud, social and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) [1]. 
Digitized data in healthcare is growing. Data is now processed 
from internal and external sources, including mobile devices, 
wearable sensor devices, Electronic Health Records (EHRs), 
Radiology Images, Videos, clinical notes, social media, blogs and 
remote health monitoring systems [2]. Terabytes of data generated 
from medical sensors is also used to increase the likelihood of 
reliable health diagnoses through accurate and detailed real-time 
data analysis [3]. However, this volume of data is growing beyond 
the capacity of the service providers and is expected to increase in 
the coming years [2]. The datasets produced are often unstructured, 
existing in formats which are isolated, disparate or incompatible 
[4]. There is often a lack of processing capabilities within 
healthcare networks to load and query the data effectively [2].  
Additionally, the boundaries for healthcare systems are 
evolving, with many patients having the option of accessing their 
healthcare data from home PCs and mobile devices. This increases 
the attack surface significantly. A lack of security for healthcare 
devices leads to both loss of patients’ privacy and potential 
physical harm to the patient. There is a risk that erroneous data is 
introduced or legitimate data is modified or suppressed by 
adversaries [5]. The security implications mean that bespoke 
systems need to be put in place to safeguard and protect data. 
However, the reliance on legacy software and bespoke systems 
result is an increased vulnerability to cyber-attacks [6]. The 
following successful hospital security breaches are testament to 
this: 
 In May 2017, the WannaCry ransomware campaign exploited 
a Server Message Block (SMB) vulnerability on TCP Port 
445. SMB is a legacy protocol used to share files and printers 
over local networks. The exploit enabled the malware to use 
worm-like network propagation, encrypting files and 
demanding ransom payment, unless the system had been 
patched by Microsoft security bulletin MS17-010. The attack 
resulted in network downtime for 48 UK hospitals, with 6 
suffering disruption lasting several days. 
 In October 2016, a UK Hospital in Lincolnshire was taken 
offline for four days due to a variant of the Globe2 
ransomware. All planned operations, outpatient appointments 
and diagnostic procedures were cancelled, with patients turned 
away and 2800 patient appointments cancelled as a result of 
the disruption. 
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 In 2008, the UKs biggest hospital lost all network connectivity 
due to several malware infection by the MyTob worm [6].  
 In 2005, a Chicago hospital lost its entire pharmacy database, 
and in order to reconstruct medication records for its patients, 
paper printouts were required to be collected from nurses’ 
stations [7].  
2 BACKGROUND 
Traditional approaches to endpoint security are no longer viable in 
the modern cyber-threat landscape [1]. Attack models have 
changed from attacks on single PCs to large scale attacks on 
entities through Advanced Persistent Threats. For example, zero 
data exploits; spear phishing, watering hole models and encrypted 
side channel methods are being increasingly used to infect critical 
systems. In addition, modern malwares have adopted and evolved 
Evasion Techniques, such as malware packing, obfuscation and 
polymorphism [1]. As such, the discussion in this section is 
focused on the specific threats and attack vectors facing healthcare 
infrastructures. 
2.1 Medical Devices 
Medical devices, in particular sensors within the body, have 
finite resources and therefore limited capabilities to self-protect. 
Wireless technologies, such as Wi-Fi, can suffer from interference 
caused by medical devices and allow malicious persons to access 
the network by masquerading as legitimate traffic. These medical 
devices often have no safeguards and are susceptible to buffer 
overflows when unexpected signals are received. Mechanical 
Ventilators are susceptible to total switch-off and change in 
ventilation rates. In addition, Syringe Pumps can be completely 
stopped. External Pacemakers, have a tendency to malfunction and 
Renal Replacement Devices have been shut off through successful 
attacks [8]. 
Most wearable devices record and collect medical data and 
then transmit the data to a remote server. This leaves the data 
vulnerable to man in the middle attacks [9]. It has been considered 
that security policies should be implemented between the wearable 
devices and the remote server, however this is unsuitable as it does 
not protect the patient wherever they travel, unless they carry a 
portable device to perform the security policy and communicate 
with the server about their persons at all times [9]. Further to this, 
an adversary can induce fatal blood glucose levels in patients with 
blood glucose sensors using two techniques [10]. Firstly, by 
forging or replaying packets sent from the Doctor. In this way, the 
attacker can introduce blood glucose imbalances through 
specifying an extremely large correction bolus. Or secondly from 
forging or replaying the patient, in this way false sensor data can 
be replayed to the Doctor to trick them into specifying a fatal dose.  
In light of the above threats, cryptography based techniques 
(data encryption or cryptographic protocols) are commonly used to 
protect medical data [11]. However this may be too expensive in 
terms of processor usage and power consumption meaning that it is 
an unfeasible approach for biomedical devices [10]. Additionally, 
cryptographic methods introduce new challenges in terms of key 
management and dissemination. It is problematic to know in 
advance who will treat a patient, and there is difficulty in relaying 
that information to the healthcare provider. This process needs to 
be quick enough so as not to interfere with treatment of the patient, 
but secure enough so as not to compromise the key [10]. Medical 
devices, such as insulin pumps and pacemakers communicate 
wirelessly, with a wearable external monitoring and control unit, 
which needs to be accessible to emergency responders and medical 
personnel. It is therefore challenging to implement effective key-
based encryption techniques due to the complexities of key 
management and revocation. Additionally, issues of limited power 
and heat-dissipation within the device compound the problem [10].  
2.2 Healthcare Security Challenges 
Within healthcare infrastructures, Medical Cyber-Physical Systems 
(MCPSs) are personal monitoring devices that can record and 
transmit multiple physiological signals [12]. The most prominent 
feature of a MCPS is the feedback loop that interacts with the 
physical environment. The data is provided to the MCPS through 
sensors that feed into the control algorithms to drive the actuators, 
which in turn change the physical environment. For safety-critical 
MCPSs, the ability to detect attackers, whilst limiting false alarms 
in order to protect the well-being of patients, is of critical 
importance [13]. However, threats to MCPS components are 
increasing with the malicious users aiming to cause node 
compromise [13]. This process can be initiated through over-the-
air software updates, stack overflow exploits or ‘logic bombs’ 
through third party developers. Security is a concern especially for 
small medical devices attached to a patient [14]. Compromise of 
storage of data could potentially result in patient death. Similarly, 
attacks on pharmacy systems could result in the wrong medication 
being prescribed leading to long term health concerns for the 
patient [14].  
Yet, the most frequent outcome of a cyber-attack on a system 
is the unavailability of patient care due to computer outages [15]. 
Other common attacks, which are a challenge to healthcare 
security systems, are outlined as follows: 
 Scanning attacks involve adversaries gathering meaningful 
information in order to launch a sophisticated attack upon an 
infrastructure [16]. These scans commonly include, IP address 
canning, port scanning and version scanning. With regards to 
Healthcare Infrastructures, an adversary can carry out segment 
scanning on HL7 information in order to learn personal 
identifiers, order numbers or patient visit information [16]. 
 Spoofing attacks involve malicious users masquerading as 
legitimate [16]. Masquerading is a passive spoofing attack 
where attackers exhilarate legitimate account credentials and 
then log in. Impersonation is an active spoofing attack, 
sometimes known as a replay attack, wherein attackers capture 
authentication traffic and replay the traffic in order to gain 
access to the healthcare infrastructure. 
 Injection attacks involve exploiting vulnerabilities of 
Structured Query Language (SQL), JavaScript and other 
computer programs in order to successfully insert untrusted 
data [16]. In doing so, attackers may gain access to healthcare 
databases, attack web users and propagate viruses. 
Additionally, they may inject malicious segments commands 
or responses in order to reduce the security of healthcare 
infrastructures.  
 Broken Authentication and Session Management involves 
attackers exploiting vulnerabilities in authentication 
mechanisms in order to assume the identities of legitimate 
users [16]. A brute force attack is an example of this kind of 
attack, taking advantage of weak passwords and small 
encryption keys, ultimately allowing a malicious user to 
perform all the functions available to a legitimate user. 
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 Distributed Denial of Service attacks (DDoS) involve 
exhausting system and network resources in order to make 
them unavailable [16]. For example a flooding-based DDoS 
sends a large number of packets to a web server, in doing so; 
legitimate requests are blocked as the CPU is overwhelmed. 
To address these security challenges, we propose a solution that 
detects unusual data behaviours within healthcare infrastructures 
using advanced data analytics techniques.  
3 APPROACH 
Our research to date has focused on the development of a system 
for modelling data flow within healthcare infrastructures. The 
system assists information security officers, within healthcare 
organisations, to improve the situational awareness of cyber-
security risks [17]. 
3.1 System Overview 
The system provides contextual awareness to detect anomalous 
behaviour within network activity and is presented in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: System Overview 
Our system is a cyber-security machine learning system, which 
improves its accuracy over time through feedback from security 
analysts. The novelty of the system proposed in this paper, is the 
addition of visualisation techniques to aid the analyst to 
understand and explore the data. There is also a specific focus on 
healthcare infrastructures, which differ from other enterprise 
infrastructures due to their reliance on insecure medical devices, 
legacy systems, and bespoke software. The main challenge of the 
work involves big data analytics to process datasets generated by 
healthcare infrastructures. As such, in the following section, the 
data pre-processing aspect of the system is presented, using 
hospital data. 
3.2 Data Collection 
The dataset presented in this paper is comprised of real world 
data from a UK-based hospital, captured off three servers, which 
provide critical functionality to the hospital. The dataset is then 
prepared and subsequently visualised to capture a baseline 
assessment of the server port mappings. Finally, the data is 
prepared by removing low-risk data, such as typical port 
mappings. This data is then visualised so that only potentially 
malicious port communications remain. The data is captured by 
executing a netstat command, which displays network connections 
on a server. Additionally, the netstat command is executed with 
the parameters –abn. The netstat–a command displays all active 
connections of the TCP and UDP ports, on which the computer is 
listening. The netstat–b command displays the executable 
program name associated with the creation of the connection or 
listening port. The netstat–n command displays active TCP 
connections numerically and no attempt is made to determine 
names, in order to facilitate the dataset analysis. Specifically, the 
netstat command is executed on the following servers: 
1. The Active Directory (AD) server, which manages directory 
based services for the hospital.  
2. The Patient Administration System (PAS) server, which 
manages core functionality, such as patient administration, 
across the hospital.  
3. Finally the Electronic Prescribing (EP) server, which 
generates, transmits and files prescriptions across the 
hospital. 
An example of a typical selection of established port in the 
dataset can be found in Table 1. 
Table 1: Active Directory Dataset Sample 
 
3.3 Data Preparation 
In order to provide an appropriate visualisation, the dataset 
undertakes a pre-processing phase. To do this, node and edge data 
are extracted and isolated into individual datasets. Three datasets 
are then produced for each data capture procedure. Examples of the 
node dataset and the two edge datasets are found in Figure 2.  
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 2: Active Directory Data Preparation – (a) Port Process – 
(b) Local Port – (c) Foreign Port  
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In Figure 2, the Source column refers to a common ID number 
indicating the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection or 
listening port. Figure 2 (a) contains the port process running on the 
IP connection. Figure 2 (b) contains the local port number and 
Figure 2 (c) contains the foreign port number.  In order to 
provide a proof of concept, the data is manually cleansed of low-
risk data. Unknown port processes, or processes running on 
unfamiliar ports, are left in the dataset, whilst common processes, 
running on secure and known port mappings are removed. 
4 VISUALISATION AND EVALUATION 
To undertake the visualisation process, a case study of different 
visualisation algorithms is presented. Firstly, Yifan Hu, which is a 
force-directed graph drawing algorithm, is used to model the 
network data through a system of bodies, with forces acting 
between them [18]. It uses a multilevel approach to find global 
optimal layouts, and the Barnes-Hut octree technique, to 
approximate short and long range forces [18]. It is the first 
algorithm to combine both techniques for large scale graph 
drawing. Typically, this multilevel approach has three phases: 
1. Coarsening: In this phase, a series of graphs are generated, 
with the aim of encapsulating the information of its parent, 
while containing fewer vertices and edges. The process 
continues until the coarsest graph layout is determined. 
2. Coarsest graph layout: In this stage, the graph is then 
presented using an algorithmic technique that combines an 
adaptive step length control scheme. 
3. Prolongation and Refinement: The layout on the coarsest 
graphs are then prolonged recursively to the finer graphs. 
Once this has been carried out, the layout is then refined 
again using the algorithm used in phase 2. This is an iterative 
process. 
This overall process is defined as follows [18]: 
(1) 
In Figure 3 the Active Directory Port Mapping is visualised. 
The Port to Port mappings are represented by circles, which are 
connected by lines. The processes associated with the creation of 
the connection are labelled. If an attacker attempts a privilege 
escalation attack, in order to extract confidential data (or perform 
a ransomware attack), they would comprise the Active Directory 
server. In Figure 4, the same Active Directory dataset is 
visualised, but the dataset has been processed to remove low-risk 
port mappings. In this case, there still remains a significant cluster 
of data present, which has been marked as of medium risk due to 
the process having been identified by the netstat command as 
Unknown. The Unknown cluster of dataset is due to a large 
number of IP addresses established on local port 445 to various 
foreign ports. As port 445 is within the 0-1023 range of ‘Well 
known Ports’, it is likely benign, but until the Process can be 
verified by a member of the hospital security team, the port 
mapping should be regarded as a potentially risk. 
 
Figure 3: Active Directory Server Port Mapping 
 
Figure 4: Processed Active Directory Server Port Mapping  
In Figure 5 the Electronic Prescribing dataset is visualised. 
This dataset has far fewer connections than the Active Directory 
dataset and has more nuanced processes running on the ports. 
Whilst it is likely that the port mappings are legitimate or low 
risk, only a few rows of data have been manually removed 
between Figure 5 and Figure 6. If an adversary wanted to 
remotely alter a patient prescription in order to cause them 
𝑖𝑓 (𝑛𝑖+1 < 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑟
𝑛𝑖+1
𝑛𝑖
> 𝑝){ 
∗  𝑥𝑖 ≔ 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 
∗  𝑥𝑖 = 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚(𝐺𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖 , 𝑡𝑜𝑙) 
∗  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥𝑖 
} 
𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑢𝑝 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑖 × 𝑛𝑖+1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑥 𝑃𝑖 
𝐺𝑖+1 =  𝑃𝑖
𝑇
𝐺𝑖𝑃𝑖 
𝑥𝑖+1 = 𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝐿𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡(𝐺𝑖+1, 𝑡𝑜𝑙) 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡: 𝑥^𝑖 = 𝑃^𝑖 𝑥^(𝑖 + 1) 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡: 𝑥𝑖 = 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐴𝑙𝑔𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑚(𝐺𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖, 𝑡𝑜𝑙) 
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥𝑖 
Coarsest Graph Layout: 
The Coarsening Phase: 
The Prolongation and Refinement Phase: 
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physical harm, they would need to compromise the Electronic 
Prescribing server. In Figure 6 only a small number of port 
mappings have been removed from the visualisation. Many more 
can likely be removed but the expertise of the IT admin staff 
within the hospital would need to be leveraged and combined with 
machine learning algorithms in order to fully realise the benefits 
of the preparation and cleansing of the data. 
 
Figure 5: Electronic Prescribing Server Port Mapping 
 
Figure 6: Processed Electronic Prescribing Server Port Mapping 
The Patient Administration System (PAS) dataset is visualised 
in Figure 7. The PAS solution hosts all patient record 
demographics and information. For many hospitals (including the 
hospital profiled in this paper) the PAS also interfaces with a 
number of other key hospital systems, such as allowing accessing 
to Electronic CaseNotes (ECN) of a patient and other critical 
healthcare information. If an adversary targets a hospital, in order 
to illegally extract patient data and patient records, either out of 
curiosity or with the intent to blackmail the patient or the hospital, 
they would very likely start with the PAS server. Specific 
healthcare infrastructures have unique systems hosted on their 
own servers, within the same infrastructure. However, 
compromising the PAS server would be an effective way to 
leverage an attack on another server. It would provide access to 
the patients NHS number or hospital number, which links to every 
other system.  
In Figure 8 the PAS system port mapping data has been 
processed by our system to remove low risk data. In this case, the 
visualisation clearly highlights the three small collections of ports 
mapped to one another in isolation, running an Unknown process.  
 
Figure 7: Patient Administration System Server Port Mapping 
 
Figure 8: Processed Patient Administration System Server Port 
Mapping 
This data should be investigated as a priority in order to 
understand which processes are running on these ports on the 
server.  
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5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The three datasets presented in this paper are identified as being 
the most valuable to a potential attacker. Depending on the 
attackers’ intentions, compromising the Active Directory server 
would allow the adversary access to the core of the organisational 
infrastructure, including all user accounts, passwords and security 
groups. Compromising the Electronic Prescribing server would 
allow an attack to alter prescriptions and doses administered to a 
patient. And finally, compromising the PAS server would allow 
an attacker access to view and modify patient data. Port mapping 
servers is of crucial importance on hospital networks. Actively 
monitoring the ports for unusual activity is a huge task, but 
preparing and cleansing the data first highlights anomalous data 
activity to a cyber security analyst to mitigate the threat. With the 
assistance of machine learning algorithms leveraging the expertise 
on in-house knowledge can assist the IT department of hospitals 
to find the ‘needle in a haystack’ of a potential cyber-attack within 
their vast data infrastructure.  
Future work will involve using datasets captured over a longer 
period of time. The dataset used in this paper represents a 
snapshot of data on three critical hospital servers. Future work 
will involve visualising data captured at select intervals, and cross 
reference the data across the various servers. In this way, the data 
can not only be profiled for malicious port mappings, suggesting 
that there is a potential attacker or malware on the hospital 
servers, but the system can also profile user behaviour, and flag 
unusual user behaviour to the IT Department. For example, if a 
user typically only logs into their account on weekdays, then if the 
account is logged in on a weekend, it may be an indication that the 
users’ username and password has been compromised by an 
attacker. The attacker could either be illegally accessing hospital 
records, or searching for further vulnerabilities within the network 
in order to perform a privilege escalation attack. 
Additionally, machine learning algorithms will be tested in 
order to automate the process once it has been refined. This will 
allow the process outlined in this paper to be performed on all 274 
of the hospital’s servers, and at regular intervals, in order to alert 
cyber security analysts of unusual port mappings shortly after they 
occur. Over time, the analyst will be order to provide feedback to 
the system through the use of supervised machine learning 
algorithms, and the algorithms will be refined and tailored to the 
unique threat landscape and infrastructure of the hospital. 
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